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Born in 1947, Christopher Norris is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff 
University. He worked first on literary criticism, then on the question of realism and 
antirealism in philosophy (as a strong adversary of antirealism), on Derrida and 
deconstructionism and, more recently, on the philosophy of science. In the past few 
years he has also authored several philosophical poems.  
In this issue we present two poems he wrote that are dedicated to color. Color is a 
recurrent theme in Norris’ poetry. Why? And why does Norris choose, for nearly ten 
years past, to mainly use poems for his philosophical investigations? Is there a link 
between his interest on color and this choice he has made?  
Moreover: Norris was always a strong adversary of antirealism and the extreme 
consequences of the “linguistic turn”. Isn’t there a contradiction between this 
philosophical position and the importance he gives to poetry? Perhaps color can give us 
a key. 
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“Let parrot-charts make room for cockatoos…” 
(Christopher Norris, Missing Hues) 
 
 
Born in 1947, Christopher Norris is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff 
University. He worked first on literary criticism, then on the question of realism and 
antirealism in philosophy (as a strong adversary of antirealism), on Derrida and 
deconstructionism and, more recently, on the philosophy of science1. In the past few 
years he has also authored several philosophical poems2.  
In this issue we present two poems he wrote that are dedicated to color. Colour is a 
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philosophical itinerary, see his auto-biographical reconstruction in C. Norris., Introduction, in Id., 
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recurrent theme in Norris’ poetry. To understand why, perhaps it is best to begin with 
the poems themselves. 
 
The first one, Missing Hues, starts not by chance with an experiment made by two 
visual scientists, Thomas Crane and Hewitt Piantanida, on impossible colors. To allow 
viewers to see colors that were at the same time red and green, or blue and yellow, the 
two scientists «had created images in which red and green stripes (and, in separate 
images, blue and yellow stripes) ran adjacent to each other»:  
 
They showed the images to dozens of volunteers, using an eye tracker to hold the images 
fixed relative to the viewers’ eyes. This ensured that light from each color stripe always 
entered the same retinal cells; for example, some cells always received yellow light, while 
other cells simultaneously received only blue light. 
The observers of this unusual visual stimulus reported seeing the borders between the 
stripes gradually disappear, and the colors seem to flood into each other. Amazingly, the 
image seemed to override their eyes’ opponency mechanism, and they said they perceived 
colors they’d never seen before. 
Wherever in the image of red and green stripes the observers looked, the color they saw 
was «simultaneously red and green», Crane and Piantanida wrote in their paper. 
Furthermore, «some observers indicated that although they were aware that what they were 
viewing was a color (that is, the field was not achromatic), they were unable to name or 
describe the color. One of these observers was an artist with a large color vocabulary3. 
 
 
There have been a lot of discussions on the possibility or impossibility of 
«impossible colors». That of red-green has been a very disquieting question, as it is well 
known, for Ludwig Wittgenstein, who didn’t simply exclude its existence – as it is quite 
often thought – but on the contrary wondered very often why we can actually see red-
green, for example, in autumn leaves4. Recently, Fiona Macpherson came back to the 
question of the impossible colours inside the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of 
Colour5.  
According to Norris, impossible colors are something to which all known colours 
«hint». It is enough to «spin the disc», and all rigid borders between hues disappear. 
																																																								
3 N. Wolchover, Red-Green & Blue-Yellow: The Stunning Colors You Can’t See, in «Live Science», 17th 
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4 I tried to examine this question in A. Barale, Il giallo del colore. Un’indagine filosofica, Jaca Book, 
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This image of the spinning disc is present also inside the analytical debate on color. 
Mark Johnston uses it to show the difference between temporary colours (like the ones 
you see on the surface of the disc) and real colors6. In Norris’ poem, however, the 
nuanced colors of the disc are perfectly real, while the rigid divisions among colors 
instead are something that we must be able to overcome and transform. There is one 
very evocative verse that says: «Let parrot-charts make room for cockatoos». «Parrot-
charts» here is a transformation for “pareto-charts”, a kind of diagram that represents 
the fixed divisions between ideal colors, while the white of cockatoos (another kind of 
parrot) stands for the possibility of infinite new colors: «As bands dissolve so we should 
quit fixed views/ Let nuance reign, let differences be slight!/ All shades conspire to hint 
at missing hues». 
This praise of nuance is far from being a mere estheticism. In fact, according to 
Norris, nuances are what allow for a change, also from an ethical and political point of 
view. As Norris explains in the introduction of poem called, not by chance, Ectopiques, 
real changes are obtained not so much through «utopian or omni-transformative 
solutions», but rather «by opting instead for carefully calibrated “ectopic” departures 
from the sociopolitical or intellectual norm»7: 
 
They got it wrong who placed it out of sight,  
Too far off, long ago, or far ahead, 
Or just too other-world to shed much light 
On hic et nunc. That’s why they lost the thread,  
Those old utopians, and went astray 
So grievously when what we want instead 
Is just a slight deflection from the way  
Things currently go on, or how they look 
When viewed close up and in the light of day8. 
 
The possibility of seeing new colors is at the same time that of seeing things 




6 M. Johnston, How to Speak of the Colours, in A. Byrne, D.R. Hilbert, Readings on Color, vol. 1, MIT 
Press, Cambridge Ma. 1997, pp. 226-7. 
7 C. Norris, Ectopiques, in Id., The Winnowing Fan, cit., p. 29. 
8 Ibidem. 
 




While in Missing Hues the flight of colours appears as generative of new 
possibilities, in Giverny it shows its character of loss and pain. Giverny is, as it is well 
known, the town where the painter Monet lived for many years. In this poem, an old 
Monet talks about the difficulty of catching colors before they get lost: «Four minutes at 
the most, and then they die». There is a contrast between the solid, vertical character of 
glory and culture (of which Monet is considered an important part), and the «sigh» that 
should be spared, according to the painter, for the disappearing colors: 
 
My dear friend Clemenceau says I'll raise high 
   The nation's cultural stock, but I take fright: 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
I’d rather he just spare a passing sigh 
   For all the hues now lost to vision's blight. 
No painted lily graces the mind's eye. 
 
The whole poem focuses on the gap between the original impressions of colors, and 
the attempts of memory and language to do justice to them (to «requite» them):  
 
Giverny’s my dream-world, yet a far cry 
   From what that vision once strove to requite: 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
Memory, technique, and the «new trick» of «photography», are all means through 
which the painter tries to «conjure up» the fugitive hues. There is no full presence that 
can be regained, however, and the cataract that afflicts the artist makes this feeling of 
loss even more acute. There is a «chaos» that can not be held at bay, because it results 
from the attempt of memory and language to do justice to a reality that escapes and 
exceeds them. Hence the impossibility of clear borders, which was already stated in 
Missing Hues: 
 
How splendid our precursors who defy 
The chaos by their colours clear and bright. 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
If we try to refer these poems to the more “classical” philosophical debate of colour, 
some questions arise, which are worth considering. 
 
1. Does this praise of the nuance mean that colour is something merely subjective? The 
 




answer is definitely not. In his prose-work, Norris dedicated an entire book, Truth 
Matters (2002), to show how color dispositionalism cannot be accepted, precisely 
because it ends up being a form of subjectivism. Dispositionalism is a philosophical 
position that was adopted frequently during the Nineties (which were the ten years that 
precede Norris’ book), not only in relation to colors but also ethics, mathematics or 
epistemology9. Its origin, however, must be sought in the philosophical debate on 
colour, and in particular in Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. Primary qualities, like shape, extension and number, «exist independently of 
human response», while secondary qualities, like taste, smells and colours, «involve 
some normative reference to the nature and modality of human sensory perception»10: 
 
Thus the truth value of a statement such as “this is a triangle” or “this triangle encloses an 
area off 22,5 square inches” must be taken as objectively fixed quite aside from our 
geometrical perceptions or extent of mathematical knowledge, whereas the statement “this 
triangle is red” can not be assessed for its truth-value without taking stock of what qualifies 
as a normal human response under normal ambient conditions11.  
 
There has been a long discussion, within the philosophy of color, on the advantages 
and the problematic aspects of this position12. Yet what is most important here is the 
reason why dispositionalism cannot be accepted according to Norris. In fact, Truth 
Matters is not a book on colour, it focuses instead on science and ethics. What becomes 
lost, in the dispositional attempt to find a middle point between subjectivism and 
objectivism, is the objective character of truth, as something that doesn’t depend on our 
knowledge of it. This has a strong ethical implication. Truth and justice are things to 
which we should try to approximate, and not things we can decide about.  
There is a close link, from this point of view, between Norris’ interest in color and 
his study of the philosophical questions of modern physics. In his book Quantum 
Theory and the Flight from Realism, he looked at how different «philosophers (Michael 
Dummett, Ian Hacking, Quine, Popper, Putnam, and Rorty, among others) had reacted 
to certain anomalous features of quantum physics – non-locality, wave-particle dualism, 
the measurement problem or observer-induced “collapse of the wave-packet” – by 
proposing a range of putative solutions, mostly involving some drastic change to our 
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10 Ibidem. 
11 Ibidem.  
12 I tried to examine these aspects of the discussion in A. Barale, Il giallo del colore, cit., pp. 11-78.	
 




basic conceptions of physical reality and/or some equally drastic revision to the ground 
rules of classical logic»13. Norris takes a strong position against those who take 
«quantum mechanics (along with chaos theory, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and 
other vaguely kindred developments)… as evidence that present-day science» has 
«nothing to do with such old-fashioned notions as reality and truth»14. Throughout his 
entire work, he doesn’t fail to recognize the «harm done» by the extreme anti-realistic 
consequences of the “linguistic turn”, or at least of its extreme anti-realistic 
consequences. He constantly criticizes «that facile notion (common to post-
structuralists, postmodernists, some Wittgensteinians, sociologists of knowledge, and 
others) that “reality” is a linguistic, discursive, textual, or social construct and hence 
that all truths claims must be viewed as relative to this or that language game, discourse, 
paradigm, conceptual scheme, or cultural mode of representation»15. 
This is also very important for Norris’ idea of colour. If we go back to Giverny, we 
see that colour, in its external reality, is something that we should try to “requite”: to re-
pay, to give justice to. There is no “adequate response” (to use the words of 
dispositionalism) which can guarantee that we are «requiting» the perceived reality. Our 
response (and its formulation into language) has to be formed, and put into question, 
time and again. 
 
 
2. Another question, however, arises: why verses? Why does Norris choose, for nearly 
ten years past, to mainly use poems for his philosophical investigations, and what is the 
link between the theoretical problems we just referred to and this choice he has made?  
I think that an answer can be sought in his Introduction to Tempus Fugitives, a 
collection of poems that Norris published in 2016. Here he writes that it is exactly the 
inventive character of verses that can guide the philosophical thought to new 
discoveries: «What is crucial is that the verse should carry the argument along in a 
natural-sounding way while also pointing up salient details, introducing nuances of tone 
or implication, and sometimes (especially through inventive or unusual rhyme-words) 
sending thought off in a new direction that very likely wouldn’t have occurred to a 
																																																								








prose writer»16. In offering «some metrical resistance to the “natural” flow of words», 
verses have the «(quite literally) thought-provoking effect of a jolt to our normal, 
linguistically habituated mental processes»17.  
In this attempt, Norris considers himself a scholar of eighteenth century poetry, of 
the verse-essays and verse epistles of Dryden, Pope, Johnson and Swift. What Norris 
seeks in the eighteenth century poetic tradition is a unity, which seems lost nowadays, 
between different dimensions: ethics, philosophy, science and art. The connection 
between these different spheres already characterized, as we have just seen, Norris’ 
whole philosophical work and inspired his criticism against anti-realism, as something 
hostile to science and to moral responsibility. Many of his poems are still dedicated to 
science: to Darwin, Gödel and even quantum physics. One of Norris’ starting points is 
the idea that poetry «is not to be conceived as a realm of meaning set apart from the 
prose of the world – as the New Critics wished – by its sui generis attributes of paradox, 
irony, ambiguity, “plurisignification”, or whatever. If poetry does have something 
verbally distinctive about it, then this is on account of its raising to uncommonly high 
levels those expressive resources that are always present, or latent, in everyday or 
nonliterary discourse»18. 
Isn’t there, however, a contradiction between Norris’ fight against the “linguistic 
turn” (or at least against its extreme anti-realistic outcomes) and his idea that language 
can guide thought to new discoveries? It is precisely color that could give us a key. In 
fact, one of the most striking aspects of colour is, already for Goethe, the unity that 
characterizes it between rules and chance. The relations among different colors follow 
some very precise norms (this inspired a great number of “geometries of colour”). 
Nevertheless, color is also something that arises, disappears and transforms itself very 
fast. This unity between «expected» and «unpredictable» is, according to Norris, also 
what allows for the «turns» that language and thought should try to realize, as he shows 
in Ectopiques, with the help of verses19. It is to the necessity of these turns, then, that 
																																																								
16 C. Norris, Introduction, in Id., Tempus fugitives, cit., p. VIII, my italics. 
17 C. Norris, Introduction, in Id., The Winnowing Fan, cit., p. XVI. See also the Introduction in Id., The 
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meter can both have a liberating effect at every level of poetic composition from the technical or formal 
to the argumentative or topical-thematic» (my italics). 
18 C. Norris, The Matter of Rhyme, cit., p. XXIV. 
19 C. Norris, Ectopiques, cit., p. 27 
 




color hints. Color recalls the necessity of these moments in which language and thought 
have to start again, turning to that reality that they can not possess but can only strive to 
«requite»: the moments in which it is necessary to «spin the disc». 
